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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we  use a generalized entropy index such as the Theil index to analyze 
regional inequalities in Europe. We proved that there is a synchronization between the 
convergence and catching-up process of objective 1 regions towards the EU15 average 
with the reform of the EU regional policy. During the period 1982-1988 the Theil index 
shows that inequalities between objective 1 regions and non-objective 1 regions have 
increased while from 1989 onwards the reduction in the inequalities between these two 
groups has been the norm. We also remark the fact that there are high disparate rates of 
growth among objective 1 regions both within countries and across countries but our 
computations show also a trend towards a more balanced growth among objective 1 
regions within and across EU countries. This success of the European Union regional 
policy in objective 1 regions will mean a big opportunity for Central and Eastern 
European countries and hence the increases in competition arising from an enlarged 
European market combined with a suitable regional development policy should in the 
future boost the growth of those countries. In the last part of the paper we made a 
simulation for the funding envelope from 2007, based on the 2000-2006 budget. We 
show that the figures of the Agenda 2000 provide enough financial support for 90% of 
the total CEEC population and for 75% of “current” objective 1 population. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL POLICY IN THE EU 
In order to fully understand EU Regional Policy certain factors must taking into 
consideration: 
Firstly, there is no natural tendency toward some kind of spatial balance in the relative 
development of the regions. 
Secondly, the positive relationship between population density and economic activity is 
a well-established feature of the EU territory. It is a well-known (and well-documented) 
fact that the pentagon-shaped area that takes in London, Paris, Milan, Munich and 
Hamburg constitutes 20% of total EU space. Within this area 40% of the total number 
of EU citizens producing about 50% of the EU’s total GDP are domiciled. This gives 
rise to major imbalances. 
Thirdly, Unconditional convergence in per capita GDP levels is not a natural tendency. 
If a certain level of convergence exists, this is noticeable only in the very long term, 
since the rate at which these economies are catching is practically negligible. 
Fourthly, economic development has to be encouraged in those regions that are lagging 
behind in terms of development or in areas suffering from severe structural problems. 
The following map reflects the spatial distribution of the population through the 
technique of population potential contours. Population Potentials offer a means of 
condensing a large quantity of information by plotting maps of population contours 
which expand from the most densely populated areas, i.e. those areas that correspond to 
the highest population potentials. They provide us with a macroscopic cartography of 
the big population centres and a classification of territorial areas based on the influence 
and distribution of the principal conurbations. The pattern of the heavy “structural” lines 
of potentials in the European territorial structure has a clear parallel in the satellite 
observations which photograph the night-time light emissions from cities, houses, 
industries etc, captured by the Earth Viewer Satellite (map2). This similarity highlights 
the usefulness of the technique of population potentials (based on an analogy with 
classical mechanics) for providing a graded image of the population distribution for 
distinct geographical areas.    3
 
The map has a blue background over which the highest population potentials are drawn 
in red. A dark shade of red indicates a high value for the population potential contour 
whilst a light shade indicates a low value. The very lowest population potential contours 
are drawn in white. The most important reference point, in terms of population in the 
East, is the metropolitan area of Moscow. The most remarkable feature of the map 
however, is the relatively compact nature of the large central settlements of the 
European Union around which there are a concentric series of population potential 
contours with decreasing levels of potential.  
 
The spatial structure of the European Union contains a large central area which is 
densely populated and which is centred around the three large metropolitan areas of 
Greater Manchester-London, Paris, and the Köln-Düsseldorf-Rhur Valley. This area 
constitutes a zone at the core of Europe in which more than 40% of the EU population 
resides, producing more than 50% of EU GDP.  Logically, the population potentials that 
make up this area have high values; the most central contour, and therefore the contour 
with the highest value represents a population value of 480.000 Inhabitants/Km. This 
area constitutes the Metropolitan heart of North-western Europe.  
In a similar way, the heavy structural lines of continental Europe are visible on the 
following nocturnal-light map. This map presents us with a satellite view of the night   4
time light emissions from cities, houses, industries and other light sources. The light 
emissions were captured and recorded using high sensitivity equipment. 
Map 2: MAPPING CITY LIGHTS WITH NIGHT TIME DATA FROM  THE DMSP 
OPERATIONAL LINESCAN SYSTEM 
 
 












1. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE EU 
According to the European Treaty, the Community must act “to promote overall 
harmonious development” and “reduce the disparities in the levels of development of 
the various regions” (Art 158). To this end the provisions of the SEA(1987) and the EU 
Treaty, Maastricht (1992), fomented integration, and were to give rise to economic and 
monetary union, while positing  Economic Development  as the back bone of European 
Regional Policy.  
The main structural features of European Regional Policy, i.e. the financial amounts 
involved, its objectives and general procedures, are undergoing reform in a three-phase 
process which began in 1989 and which will continue until 2006. This process has 
provided the E.U. with its current structure, (European Commission 1989, 1993, 1994a, 
1994b and European Council 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e) 
Financially, regional policy funding doubled during the first programming period 1989-
1993 (Delors I package) while in the second period, 1994-1999 (Delors II package) the 
figure was redoubled.   5
On looking at EU objectives, it will be found that these have been streamlined, in the 
sense that, now there only exist regions which are deemed to be objective 1, 2 or 3. This 
streamlining in terms of objectives and the renewed focus on the population receiving 
assistance may be considered to be a key feature of EU Regional Policy. The main 
priorities of EU regional cohesion policy remain Europe’s most needy areas and its least 
developed regions.  
With respect to the general procedures for policy making within the EU, a new 
framework for planning and programming through negotiation was set up, which was to 
take effect throughout the various levels of public authority.  This device was termed 
the Community Support Frameworks (CSF).  Strategic planning is carried out via a 
system, in which various agents and governmental bodies attempt to reach agreements 
on the various measures and priorities that need to be adopted in view of the regional 
SWOT analysis carried out. Investment from structural funds is channelled towards the 
priorities that emerge from regional strategic planning and CSF through Operational 
Programs.  
With the financial support of structural funds, the less developed regions have begun to 
perform positively in a period of intensified competition through the completion of the 
internal market, the liberalization of the movement of monies and capital in the EU and 
within the wider context of global competition in the world economy. This push 
towards higher levels of integration, combined with the strengthening of Regional 
Policy and the competitive advantages of the poorer regions, has favoured the 
convergence of the objective 1 regions. The performance of the objective 1 regions can 
be seen in the following map, which represents the regional distribution of accumulative 
growth rates over the period 1995-1999. These accumulative growth rates have been 
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One striking feature of regional growth patterns in the EU is the highly positive growth 
potential demonstrated by the less developed regions. In the weaker regions, regional 
strategic planning and programming with support from Structural Funds have facilitated 
many of the supply-side improvements, a strengthening of their production potential 
and a shift into higher value-added sectors (see reports European Commission 1991, 
1996a, 2000).  A closer appraisal of the regions whose development is lagging would 
show that their performance and the rate at which they are catching up has not been 
uniform (Tondl 1997, Tsoukalis 1992, Bradley et al. 1995, Axt 1992, Baussola and 
Fiorito 1994, Alogoskoufis 1995), but in general terms, this particular group of regions 
has become one of the most actively expansive in the EU.   
In order to give a more technical approach to the leading and lagging regional growth 
discussed in the first part of this section, we use a Generalized Entropy Index such as 
the Theil index of concentration as the main analytical instrument
1. The Theil 
coefficient of concentration (Theil, 1967) became a very popular index for analysing 
spatial distributions. Different authors (Batty, 1974, 1976, Walsh and O´Kelly, 1979, 
Walsh and Webber, 1977) have shown the merits of this index. No only is it neither 
scale
2 nor mean dependent
3 and it is not excessively affected by extreme values, but is 
also independent of the number of regions
4 and can therefore be used to compare the 
inequalities that exist between different regional systems. Moreover, the coefficient is 
decomposable
5 in between-group and within-group inequalities and in this way it can be 
used to analyse inequality on different geographical scales simultaneously (Wash and 
O´kelly 1979, p. 271). Furthermore, Bourguignon (1979), Shorrocks (1980) and Cowell 
                                                 
1The vast theoretical and empirical literature on inequalities has produced a substantial number of 
measures. See Cowell (1995) for an excellent survey of measures and their potential drawbacks. 
2This characteristic is called the income scale independence principle and states that a desirable measure 
of inequality should be homogeneous of degree zero, that is if we scale all of incomes by the same 
number, our measure of inequality should not change. For instance variance of income does not fit this 
principle (if we double the incomes, the variance quadruples). 
3This characteristic is called the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and states that a good inequality measure  
should rise in response to a mean preserving redistribution from a poor to a rich person or in other words 
the numerical value of an inequality index should increase when there is a transfer of income from 
someone lower in the income distribution to someone higher in the income distribution, holding everyone 
else´s income constant. Most measures satisfy this principle being the main exception the variance of 
logarithms. 
4This characteristic is called the principle of population or replication invariance and postulates that the 
distribution of the cake should not depend on the number of the cake receivers. That is, if we measure 
inequality in an economy with N regions and then merge it with another identical economy, inequality in 
the larger economy should be the same (Dalton 1920). Indices such as the weighted coefficient of 
variation is sensitive to the number of regions and therefore cross-national comparisons of its values are 
statistically biased. 
5This characteristic is called the principle of decomposability.   7
(1995) showed that the only inequality indices that simultaneously satisfy all the 
principles mentioned are the Generalized Entropy Indices. These characteristics made 
the Theil index particularly suitable for analysis of the European case, where regional 
development has a strong geographical component, thus justifying the adoption of the 












y =   as 
the average per capita income of the Whole European Union, we can express the 











i IC IC x
GDP
GDP






































IC log       (3) 








∈ =   stands for the per capita income of region i 





y =   is the average per capita 
income of the “r ” group of regions, we can express the regional share of the average  







∈ = . 
IC  stands for Total Inequality,  br IC  is between-group inequality and  wr IC  is within-
group inequality. Notice that the global inequality index may be broken down into two 
components, a between or across-group of regions index and a weighted average of 
                                                 
6The Theil coefficient can be interpreted as the log of a weighted geometric mean of regional per capita 
incomes deflated by the national average, the weights being represented by the income shares. A dual 
form also exists, in which the role of population shares and income shares are interchanged, but we have 
preferred the original one for its direct relationship  with the entropy concept (Theil, 1967,p.127). With 
respect to the standard deviation of log per capita income, adopted in the analysis of σ -convergence, the 
Theil coefficient presents the advantage of being weighted, independent of the number of regions and 
decomposable in between- and within-set shares.    8
within-group of regions inequalities. It should be noticed that the weights are in form of 
the aggregate incomes rather than population sizes. 
Taking into account the above expressions, we have calculated the Theil Index for the 
regions of the European Union over different time periods, using two different 
European accounting systems (ESA79 and ESA95) and different numbers of regions. In 
all of the computations of the Theil index we have classified the European regions into 
two groups: On the one hand we consider the less developed regions or the “objective 1 
group” in the European Union. This group logically takes in the objective 1 regions
7. 
On the other we consider the remaining regions in the European Union, i.e., those that 
fall outside the objective 1 category and that we will call “non-objective 1 group”. This 
classification provides us with a means of measuring the dispersion in the distribution of 
income between those two groups and thus we are able to assess if a convergence 
process between them is taking place. 
The GDP variable used in the Theil formula is expressed in terms of purchasing power 
standards (PPS) at constant 1985 prices. The data was provided by the European 
statistical office (EUROSTAT). As mentioned above, however, our analysis is based on 
two series of data that are not perfectly homogeneous for the years they overlap: One 
series is for 1982-1997 (ESA79) and the other for 1995-1999 (ESA95
8). 
The first computations of the Theil Index have been made for the period (1982-1997) 
with ESA79. This is our longest Theil series and takes in 131 regions in the EU12. The 
“objective 1 group” comprises 38 regions and the “non-objective 1 group” 93 regions
9. 
The results are given in table 1. 
For each year and for each of the two groups considered table 1 gives the population 
shares, the income shares, the logarithm of the ratio shares and the contribution to the 
Theil index. Finally, the last three columns give the numerical values of the Theil index 
for between groups, within groups and the total. 
 
                                                 
7In all  our computations “objective 1 group” takes in those NUTS II regions that were objective 1 either 
in the first programming period (1989-1994) (Delor´s I Package) or in the second programming period 
(1995-1999) (Delor´s II Package) and “non-objective 1 group” takes in the remainder of the European 
Union NUTS II regions. 
8The move to ESA95 based accounts in 1999 was planned to address a range of inconsistencies and 
establish a new Eurostat-compatible and consistent data set from 1995. 
9 Annex A lists the NUTS II regions that belongs to each group considered. 
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Table 1: Population and Income Shares for objective 1  and non-objective 1 group of regions and 
the Theil Index  (1982-1997) 















obj 1 group  0,3258  0,1839  -0,5720  -0,1052 
1982 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6742 0,8161  0,1911  0,1559 
0,0507 0,0137 0,0645 
obj 1 group  0,3274  0,1865  -0,5627  -0,1050 
1983 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6726 0,8135  0,1902  0,1547 
0,0498 0,0180 0,0677 
obj 1 group  0,3291  0,1868  -0,5664  -0,1058 
1984 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6709 0,8132  0,1923  0,1564 
0,0506 0,0185 0,0692 
obj 1 group  0,3302  0,1863  -0,5725  -0,1066 
1985 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6698 0,8137  0,1947  0,1584 
0,0518 0,0192 0,0710 
obj 1 group  0,3319  0,1852  -0,5834  -0,1080 
1986 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6681 0,8148  0,1985  0,1617 
0,0537 0,0182 0,0719 
obj 1 group  0,3321  0,1878  -0,5704  -0,1071 
1987 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6679 0,8122  0,1957  0,1590 
0,0519 0,0179 0,0697 
obj 1 group  0,3316  0,1919  -0,5471  -0,1050 
1988 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6684 0,8081  0,1898  0,1534 
0,0484 0,0174 0,0659 
obj 1 group  0,3306  0,1923  -0,5420  -0,1042 
1989 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6694 0,8077  0,1879  0,1517 
0,0475 0,0169 0,0644 
obj 1 group  0,3254  0,1896  -0,5404  -0,1024 
1990 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6746 0,8104  0,1835  0,1487 
0,0463 0,0186 0,0648 
obj 1 group  0,3258  0,1924  -0,5266  -0,1013 
1991 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6742 0,8076  0,1805  0,1458 
0,0444 0,0177 0,0622 
obj 1 group  0,3248  0,1951  -0,5098  -0,0994 
1992 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6752 0,8049  0,1757  0,1414 
0,0420 0,0181 0,0601 
obj 1 group  0,3230  0,1951  -0,5044  -0,0984 
1993 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6770 0,8049  0,1731  0,1393 
0,0410 0,0179 0,0588 
1994 obj  1  group  0,3236  0,1948  -0,5076  -0,0989  0,0415  0,0183  0,0598 
   10
  non-objective 1 
group  0,6797 0,8058  0,1702  0,1372 
   
obj 1 group  0,3200  0,1966  -0,4873  -0,0958 
1996 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6800 0,8034  0,1668  0,1340 
0,0382 0,0191 0,0573 
obj 1 group  0,3198  0,1994  -0,4722  -0,0942 
1997 
non-objective 1 
group  0,6802 0,8006  0,1629  0,1304 
0,0363 0,0196 0,0558 
 
 
If we focus on the between-group inequality which aims to proxy the catching-up 
process of objective 1 regions with respect to the non-objective 1, table 1 reflects a 
change in the general tendency. Between 82 and 87 the disparity remained relatively 
constant rising from a value of 0.0507 in 1982 to 0.0519 in 1987. Between 1988 and 
1997 however the income disparities between these two groups shrunk from 0.0484 in 
1988 to 0.0363 in 1997. The within-group inequality, on the other hand tended to 
increase slightly. The total or overall Theil index displays almost the same pattern as the 
Theil index between groups. This would seem to indicate that the increase in the 
regional inequalities from 1982 to 1987 was driven by an increase in both the between-
group component and the within-group component of the Theil Index. In 1982 the 
between-group contribution to European inequality was 0.0507 (as we saw in table 1) 
and by 1987 this figure had risen to 0.0519. With respect to the within-group 
contribution to the European inequality the figures rose from 0.0137 in 1982 to 0.0179 
in 1987.  
The decrease in regional inequality in the European Union from 1987 to 1997 was 
driven by a decrease in the between group component of total inequality. The between 
group contribution to total inequality was 0.0484 in 1988 and by 1997 this figure had 
risen to 0.0363. In this period the within-group inequality follows a relatively stable 
path. The graphic representation offered in figures 1 and 2 provide a vision which 
underline the similarities between the patterns traced by between-group inequalities and 
total inequality. Figure 3 provides a representation of the relative contributions of the 
between-group inequalities and the within-group inequalities to the total inequality and 
as such offers a graphic comparison of the three.    11
Figure 1: Theil Between Groups























Figure 2: Theil Total
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It can be seen from figure 3 that between-group inequality contributes proportionally 
more to the total inequality than within-group inequality. Moreover, there is a stable 
tendency of within-group inequality and a decreasing tendency of the between-group 
inequality. The breakdown of the Theil index into between-group and within-group 
components helps to highlight the convergence process taking place in the levels of 
income across groups and  the relative stagnation in terms of within-group inequalities 
from 1987-1997 in the EU12. 
In order to enhance the sample of regions at our disposal we compute the Theil index 
for the period 1988-1997 (ESA79). The new sample includes 189 regions
10 all of which 
belong to the 15 present-day European Union countries. The general conclusions that 
may be drawn are similar to those given above for the smaller sample of regions. The 
reduction inequalities in income is due to the constant decrease in the gap in the Theil 
index between the two groups,  which means that there is a convergence process taking 
place across groups of regions, in other words between objective 1 and non-objective 1 
regions. Table 2 gives the results of the computations and can be read in similar terms to 
table 1. 
                                                 
10 Annex B lists the NUTS II regions that belongs to each group considered   13
Table 2: Population and Income Shares for objective 1  and non-objective 1 group of 
regions and the Theil Index Between the two groups (1988-1997) 









obj 1 group  0,2072  0,1352  -0,4270  -0,0577 
1988 
non-objective 1 
group  0,7928 0,8648  0,0870  0,0752 
0,0175 
obj 1 group  0,2068  0,1358  -0,4204  -0,0571 
1989 
non-objective 1 
group  0,7932 0,8642  0,0857  0,0741 
0,0170 
obj 1 group  0,2046  0,1346  -0,4190  -0,0564 
1990 
non-objective 1 
group  0,7954 0,8654  0,0844  0,0730 
0,0167 
obj 1 group  0,2045  0,1379  -0,3946  -0,0544 
1991 
non-objective 1 
group  0,7955 0,8621  0,0805  0,0694 
0,0150 
obj 1 group  0,2041  0,1376  -0,3942  -0,0542 
1992 
non-objective 1 
group  0,7959 0,8624  0,0802  0,0692 
0,0150 
obj 1 group  0,2034  0,1391  -0,3801  -0,0529 
1993 
non-objective 1 
group  0,7966 0,8609  0,0776  0,0668 
0,0140 
obj 1 group  0,2039  0,1393  -0,3808  -0,0530 
1994 
non-objective 1 
group  0,7961 0,8607  0,0780  0,0671 
0,0141 
obj 1 group  0,2022  0,1391  -0,3735  -0,0520 
1995 
non-objective 1 
group  0,7978 0,8609  0,0760  0,0654 
0,0135 
obj 1 group  0,2020  0,1395  -0,3701  -0,0516 
1996 
non-objective 1 
group  0,7980 0,8605  0,0754  0,0649 
0,0132 
obj 1 group  0,2019  0,1406  -0,3622  -0,0509 
1997 
non-objective 1 
group  0,7981 0,8594  0,0741  0,0637 
0,0127 
   
Figure 4 plots the evolution of the Theil index from 1988 to 1997 in the EU15 between 






   14
Figure 4: Theil between groups










































































Finally, in order to bring the study of the regional convergence patterns in the European 
Union up to date using the most recent data available, we compute the numerical values 
for the Theil index for the period 1995-1999 based on ESA95 accounting. As before we 
divide the whole sample of NUTS II regions into two groups corresponding to objective 
1 and non-objective 1 regions
11. 
Table 3 provides the main results of the computations for the Theil index and reflects 
the reduction in income disparities between the two groups. This should be viewed as a 
conclusive proof of the catching-up process taking place between objective 1 regions 











                                                 
11Annex C lists the NUTS II regions that belongs to each group considered    15
Table 3: Population and Income Shares for objective 1  and non-objective 1 group of 
regions and the Theil Index Between the two groups (1995-1999) 
Year  Type of Group  Pop. Sh. 
Income 






obj 1 group  0,24439 0,17259 -0,34786 -0,06004 
1995 
non-objective 1 
group  0,75561 0,82741 0,09078 0,07511 
0,01507
obj 1 group  0,24413 0,17341 -0,34204 -0,05931 
1996 
non-objective 1 
group  0,75587 0,82659 0,08944 0,07393 
0,01462
obj 1 group  0,24382 0,17402 -0,33726 -0,05869 
1997 
non-objective 1 
group  0,75618 0,82598 0,08829 0,07293 
0,01424
obj 1 group  0,24354 0,17311 -0,34134 -0,05909 
1998 
non-objective 1 
group  0,75646 0,82689 0,08902 0,07361 
0,01452
obj 1 group  0,24317 0,17533 -0,32709 -0,05735 
1999 
non-objective 1 
group  0,75683 0,82467 0,08584 0,07079 
0,01344
   
Figure 5 plots the values of the between-group Theil index and gives the comparative 
performance of objective 1 regions. 
Figure 5: Theil Between Groups
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The general tendency towards a decrease in inequality between the two groups becomes 
evident from this figure. There is however a small increase in inequality between 1997 
and 1998. 
Theil computations underline the special importance of the assistance provided for the 
objective 1 regions within the broader context of boosting the total growth of the EU. 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 reflect the level of correlation in both the phases of divergence and 
convergence for the period 1982-1997 with the reforms of the European Union regional   
policy. The reduction in the disparities between the objective 1 and non-objective 1 
groups has been taking place ever since the Delor´s I (1989-1993) and Delor´s II (1994-
1999) packages come into effect, signalling the reform of regional policy. 
  
2. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, REGIONAL POLICY AND THE 
EUROPEAN MARKET 
Accession to the European Union will constitute both a great opportunity and a stern 
challenge for the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). The EU offers 
these countries a powerful developmental strategy, which is based on a combination of 
market competition and development policy. The EU also offers a structural 
development policy that focuses on the regions whose development is lagging behind. 
This tool is an investment policy rather than a price support tool and is aimed at 
maximising the advantages derived from the competitive forces arising from the 
integration within a larger market. Competition in a large market within the framework 
of European Economic and Monetary Union will foster competitiveness in domestic 
sectors and attract foreign direct investment to take advantages of new business 
opportunities. Fomenting competition within an enlarged market, combined with a solid 
regional development policy in the EU, has proved to be a successful policy mix which 
has been capable of boosting the growth of the objective 1 regions within the 
framework of an open market economy. 
By the end of the present programming period the proportion of the populations in the 
current EU-15 receiving assistance, i.e. those populations in regions where the average 
per capita GDP is below 75% of the EU average, should have decreased by about 25%. 
By the end of the programme therefore, there should be more intense support for the 
most needy regions. Further, the gradual attainment of these objectives, frees resources 
which may then be focussed on other goals, such as restructuring and unemployment.   17
Hypothetically however, in a European Union made up of 21 or 25 countries, the 
number of objective 1 regions would increase dramatically since many of these 
incoming countries have low levels of per capita GDP and development. The overall 
proportion of numbers of the EU population living in objective 1 regions would thus 
increase. Baring in mind that 90% of the population of the future member States in the 
EU-25 would receive assistance, if the percentage of the assisted population in the 
current EU-15 was to remain the same, this would mean that 31% of the population of 
an EU-25 would fall into the category of an objective 1 region. 
The accession of the CEE countries will lower the statistical threshold for the Objective 
1 regions with respect to per capita GDP (see maps EU-21 and EU-25), since these 
countries have lower levels of development. If there was a premature withdrawal of 
assistance to these countries this would undoubtedly have dramatically negative 
ramifications since this aid has come to constitute a source of growth-potential and a 
means by which the cyclical nature of the economic lag might be overcome. In effect, 
the withdrawal of funds would have markedly negative consequences for those regions 
where the funds are at present most needed and most successful in fomenting growth. 
If the threshold for the objective 1 regions is lowered then there must be some kind of 
compensatory mechanism in order to maintain the positive momentum which is being 
generated in the existing objective 1 regions, and to maintain the coherence inherent in 
EU regional policy. At the same time, it is important that the focus of structural funds 
remains aimed at those regions, which are most needy. It is precisely these regions that, 
whilst being, by definition, the most underdeveloped, are also those regions that possess 
the greatest potential for economic expansion and hence, the prime aim of policy should 
be to enable these regions to compete on their own. 
A viable mechanism for counter-balancing the essentially statistical negative effect of 
the enlargement of the EU, might be to consider those regions of the current EU-15 
whose GDP ph is below 75% of the EU average, as objective 1 regions, prior to the 
accession of new Member States. That is, by calculating their real development levels as 














3. THE EXPERIENCE OF TWO GENERATIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMMES: DELORS I PACKAGE AND DELORS II PACKAGE   
In the past two generations of EC regional development programmes (1989-1993 
Delors´I package and 1994-1999 Delors´II package) the main emphasis has been put on 
the improvement of transport networks, telecommunications and energy supply 
infrastructure (28 percent of structural funs transfers). The second-largest share of EU 
funds included the implementation, upgrading and restructuring of industrial and 
tourism activities and the modernization of the agricultural sector. The third 
development priority of EU funds has been the improvement of labour force skills. 
Although there are Public Choice patterns revealed in the distribution of funds, 
countries´ policies have different focus with respect to infrastructure, development of 
the productive sector and human capital. Very briefly, we are going to analyze the 
different strategies followed by the main recipient countries granted with Delors´I and 
Delors´II packages. 
Portugal 
The two generations of Community Support Frameworks (CSF) in Portugal 
concentrated its efforts in the modernization of the productive sector (36 percent of EU 
funds in 1989-1993 and 30 percent of EU funds in 1994-1999), infrastructure projects 
(26 and 24 percent of EU funds respectively) and the improvement of the educational 
situation (25 percent of EU funds). CSF II funds are also devoted to supplement 
Portuguese expenditures on environment and urban regeneration and to improve public 
health and social services. 
Spain 
Since its entry into the European Community, Spain has received large amounts via 
ERDF that channel into infrastructure projects. This is confirmed looking at the 
structure of spending of the CSF I (40 percent to economic infrastructure). Measures of   19
professional training to upgrade skills of active labour force and requalify unemployed 
constituted the second priority (24 percent of CSF I funds). The third priority of CSF I 
was the improvement of the productive sector largely focused on the agricultural sector 
(21 percent of funds). However, under the CSF II improvements of the production 
system gains most importance (30 percent of EU funds). This would encompass 
industry, agriculture as well as tourism. Measures to improve human capital gain 
noticeable ranking under CSF II (28 percent) while infrastructures projects were 
reduced (29 percent).  
Greece 
The most striking feature of the Greek CSFs is that the major part of the funds was 
placed for large scale infrastructure projects in the transport sector, telecommunications 
and energy supply (33 percent of EU funds in 1989-1993 and 39 percent of the EU 
funds in 1994-1999). The improvement of human capital (25 percent of the EU funds in 
1989-1993 and 19 percent in 1994-1999) and the plans for a very active industrial 
development policy specially in the CSF II  has been considered as the second most 
important development priorities (25 percent of EU funds in CSF I and CSF II). It is 
important to mention that during the CSF II a considerable share of funds is reserved for 
improving health services and related social aid schemes (17 percent of EU funds). 
Italy 
Among the development priorities in Italy under CSFs the funds that goes to the   
improvement of the productive sector (industry, crafts, related services, tourism and 
agriculture) are the most (39 percent in 1989-1993 and 48 percent in 1994-1999). 
Spending on infrastructure is much lower than in the other countries (22 percent and 17 
percent respectively) given that Italian infrastructure is fairly advanced. An important 
share of EU funds is devoted to enhance labour skills (21 percent in CSF I and CSF II). 
Germany 
The CSF programmes for East Germany (New German Länder) differs from the other 
objective 1 programmes leaving aside financial support for infrastructure and public 
services and concentration on the modernization  and expansion of production base 
(stimulate formation of new enterprises, particularly SMEs) and labour market measures 
(qualification of labour force according to present technological standards and 
reintegration of unemployed).   20
Table 4 capsulize the percentage allocation of structural and cohesion funds by policy 
area for the CSF I (1989-1993) and CSF II (1994-1999) in the southern-peripheral 
recipient countries.  
 
TABLE 4: SHARE IN % OF TOTAL ALLOCATION CSF I AND CSF II 
ACCORDING TO DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES 
 PORTUGAL  SPAIN  GREECE  ITALY 
  1989-93  1994-99  1989-93  1994-99  1989-93 1994-99  1989-93 1994-99 
1. Economic 
Infrastructure 








25.2 24.8  24.2  28.4  24.8 18.8  21.6 21.4 
4. Living 
conditions 
5.0 16.8  13.8  11.5  10.0 17.2  16.6 13.1 
5. Others  6.7  4.4  0.5  0.7  6.8 1.4  0.4 0.6 
Note: Adapted from Tondl (1998) 
Economic infrastructure takes in roads, rail, ports, energy and telecommunications. 
Productive sector modernization takes in Industry and services, tourism, agriculture and fisheries. 
Human resources and employment takes in general education, vocational training: workforce, school leavers, 
unemployed and  R&D. 
Living conditions takes in Environment and urban regeneration, health and social integration. 
Others takes in measures on regional imbalances, CSF technical assistance and training civil servants.  
 
Since 1989, when the CSF I came into place, the growth performance of objective 1 
regions as a whole outperformed the average growth of an EU15 region, so contributing 
to the decline of European income disparities. Table 5 shows the average per capita 
GDP growth per annum for objective 1 regions in each of the recipient countries. For 
the computations, per capita GDP values for the different objective 1 regions were 
transformed into purchasing power parities (PPP) at constant 1985 prices. The time 
periods we have chosen represent the span in which the two regional development 
programmes have been operational
12.  
 
                                                 
12 Although the second CSF was in place in 1994, we chose the interval 1995-1999 in order to be able to 
use the new EUROSTAT (ESA 95)  figures.    21
Table 5: Average per capita GDP growth per 
annum for objective 1 regions in main recipient 
countries 
 




Denmark   0.022 
Spain 0.0073  0.037 
France -0.014  0.020 
Greece 0.003  0.041 
Ireland 0.047  0.065 
Italy -0.005  0.032 
Portugal 0.015  0.038 
United Kingdom  0.013  0.026 
Av.Ob.1 Regions  0.0055  0.0337 
UE15 -0.01  0.027 
Source: Author´s own elaboration 
The figures in table 5 show that on average objective 1 regions have higher growth rates 
than UE15 as a whole both during the first and during the second Delors´ packages. 
Looking at the particular performance of countries, Spanish and Portuguese regions in 
general and their objective 1 regions in particular all enjoyed an impressive high growth 
period since 1989 following the stagnation they experienced in the early 1980s, due the 
stabilization policies and in the case of Spain the economic restructuring. Growth rates 
in objective 1 regions for these two countries in both periods were far above the EU15 
and the average objective 1 region.  Spanish objective 1 regions´growth rates went from 
0.73% during the CSF I to 3.7% during CSF II. In the case of Portugal the figures were 
1.5% and 3.8% respectively. It is quite remarkable the case of Ireland -the so-called 
“Irish miracle”- were the growth rates in both periods were impressive (4.7% and 6.5% 
respectively). By contrast, Italian and Greek regions remained on a rather weak growth 
path throughout the CSF I (-0.5% and 0.03% respectively). These regions encountered 
severe difficulties in implementing and operating CSF I, mainly due to the 
incompetence and inefficiency of public administration.  During the CSF II, clear 
macroeconomic policy commitments and a better performance of the administrative 
system allowed objective 1 regions in these countries to gain momentum reaching 
average growth rates of 3.2% and 4.1% respectively.   22
As to the differences in regional growth performance for regions within a country, the 
statistics are set out in table 6 which indicates average regional per capita GDP growth 
in 1989-1993 and 1995-1999. In the case of Denmark, we computed only the average 
growth rates for its objective 1 regions for the period 1995-1999 because they had been 
granted objective 1 status in 1991. Moreover, we have also computed the standard 
deviation, minimum value and maximum value for the growth rates and the difference 
between them for objective 1 regions within a country and for objective 1 regions across 
countries
13. 
The figures in table 6 stress the comments given in table 5. Most of the Spanish and 
Portuguese objective 1 regions experienced positive growth rates in 1989-1993, a 
general recession period in most of the EU countries. The only exceptions were the 
regions of Valencia and Murcia in the case of Spain and the Alentejo region in the case  
                                                 
13 Across countries computations take in the objective 1 regions of Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal.    23 
Table 6: Average per capita GDP growth per annum for objective 1 regions  
 




































Galicia  0.73 3.66 Anatoli  M.  0.63 3.07 Abruzo  -0.64  1.72 Norte  2.07 3.16 Berlin  0.0 
Asturias 0.15 3.53 Kentriki  M.  1.25 4.5  Molise -1.44  3.74 Centro 2.30 2.86 Brandenburgo  2.15 
Cantabria    4.43 Dytiki  M.  -2.41  4.98 Campania  -1.31  3.01 Lisboa    1.37 4.76 Mecklenburgo  2.20 
C.Leon  1.55 3.07 Thessalia  -0.47  3.92 Puglia -1.61  3.01 Alentejo -2.97  2.35  Chemnitz  3.01 
C.la  Mancha  0.91 3.12 Ipeiros -0.3 7.19 Basilicata  0.24 4.24 Algarve  1.54 3.26 Dresden  1.87 
Extremadura  2.85 4.05 Ionia  Nisia  1.30 4.31 Calabria  -0.69  3.31 Azores 2.43 4.33 Leipzig  1.08 
Valencia  -0.28  4.46 Dytiki  E.  1.28 2.93 Sicilia 0.71 2.96 Madeira  3.95 6.02 Dessau  2.20 
Andalucia  0.48 3.64 Sterea  E.  -3.32  2.92 Sardegna  0.60 3.69       Halle  2.69 
Murcia -0.51  3.87  Pelopon.  -0.87  3.45          Magdeburgo  3.47 
Ceuta  y  Mel  1.12 2.83 Antiki 2.41 3.05          Thüringen  3.42 
Canarias 0.27 4.6  Voreio  A.  2.87  4.97             
    Notio  A.  0.92  4.82             
    Kriti  0.61  3.83             
Desv.  St.  0.97 0.59 Desv.  St.  1.76 1.20 Desv.  St.  0.93 0.75 Desv.  St.  2.15 1.28 Desv.  St.  1.07 
Min  -0.51 2.83  Min  -3.32 2.92  Min  -1.61 1.72  Min  -2.97 2.35  Min  0.0 
Max.  2.85 4.60 Max.  2.87 7.19 Max.  0.71 4.24 Max.  3.95 6.02 Max.  3.47 
Dif.  3.36 1.77 Dif.  6.19 4.27 Dif.  2.32 2.52 Dif.  6.91 3.67 Dif.  3.47 
D.St. Acr  1.61 1.01 Min  Across  -3.32  1.72 Max 
Across 
3.95 7.19 Dif.  Across  7.26 5.47    
Source: Author´s own elaboration   24
of Portugal. On the contrary, Greece and Italy had a worst performance for their 
objective 1 regions in the 1989-1993 period.  Greece counted five objective 1 regions  
with negative growth (Ditiki, Thessaly, Ipeiros, Peloponnesus and Sterea Ellada) and all 
Italian objective 1 regions had negative growth rates with the only exceptions of 
Basilicata and the Italian Islands (Sicilia and Sardegna). The 1995-1999 period was 
much better of, all the Community economies began growing again, but again objective 
1 regions have performed better than the typical EU15 region. 
This detailed analysis of what has occurred in the EU objective 1 regions from 1989 
until 1999 highlights the clear influence which the evolution of the national economy 
has on its regional achievements. This point has also been remarked in other empirical 
studies (Rodriguez-Pose 1998, Tondl, 1998, Cuadrado-Roura 2001). 
Moreover, in table 6 is also patent the disparate rates of growth that objective 1 regions 
have experienced in the past two CSFs, especially the cases of Greece and Portuguese 
objective 1 regions. However, the statistics we have computed remark a trend in terms 
of a more balanced growth rate for objective 1 regions within countries and across 
countries. The standard deviation and the difference between the maximum and 
minimum growth rates for objective 1 regions within countries have been reduced in the 
period 1989-1999. The only exception in terms of the gap between the maximum and 
minimum growth rate applies for Italy. 
Looking at the statistics across objective 1 regions, the picture is much the same. There 
was a reduction in the standard deviation of growth rates and a reduction of the 
difference between maximum and minimum growth rates in 1989-1999. Nonetheless, 
objective 1 regions making up each country have more similar growth rates to one 
another than to regions in other EU member states. Even though, it is important to 
emphasize this good trend, there are still big differences among the growth performance 
of the objective 1 regions that the authorities must deal with in order to achieve a more 
balanced growth. 
 
4. THE AGENDA 2000 AND THE FUTURE OF EU REGIONAL POLICY: 2007 
AND THE FINANCIAL ENVELOPE FOR BACKWARD REGIONS 
The guidelines for the medium-term implementation and funding of the main EU 
policies were agreed at the Berlin Summit (March 1999), where the European Council 
set out a coherent framework in order to fit expenditure commitments to foreseen 
resources. Focussing assistance on the neediest areas is at the core of the arrangements   25
drawn up by the European Council at the Berlin Summit. This principle aims to promote 
financial stability by assisting regions with structural problems and by easing the path 
toward enlargement and the accession of the CEE countries. The principle of 
concentration of assistance means that the perspectives for the period 2000-2006 are the 
source of a certain cautious optimism, in that, on the one hand, funds have been set 
aside for the existing objective 1 regions, whilst on the other, there remains enough 
financial room for manoeuvre in order to tackle the enlargement process, both with 
respect to the Pre-accession Financial Instrument, and the PHARE program, as well as 
for the structural interventions in the new member States, (future acceding countries 
after 2002). 
 Table 4 defines both the framework within which EU policies are undertaken at the 
moment i.e. a framework that involves 15 member states, and the hypothetical 
framework which would come into play should there be up to 21 members States. 
 
TABLE 7: FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES (EU15) AND THE FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK (EU21) 
 
A:  FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES EU15  B:  FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 
EU21  EUR Million 1999 prices-
Appropriations for commitments 
2000-2006  Year 2006  2000-2006  Year 2006 
1 .AGRICULTURE 
CAP expenditure (excluding rural 
development) 

































3. INTERNAL  POLICIES  42,350 6,200 42,350 6,200
4. EXTERNAL  ACTION  32,060 4,610 32,060 4,610























7. PRE-ACCESSION AID 
 
Agriculture 
Pre-Accession structural instrument 

































TOTAL APROPRIATIONS FOR 
COMMITMENTS 
 
640,470 90,260 702,780 107,040
CEILING ON APROPRIATIONS FOR 
PAYMENTS 
Appropriations for payments as % of GNP 
Margin 



















SOURCE: Conclusions of the Presidency, Berlin European Council 24-25 March 1999. 
 
The previous table reflects the total amounts of expenditure under the different headings 
for the present EU-15 (financial framework) and for the EU-21 under the hypothesis of 
enlargement (financial framework) over the period 2000-2006.  
The foreseeable amount of resources and the Community financial rules governing the 
“Own resources” ceiling are reflected within these frameworks. The derived reserve 
margin is given at the bottom of the table. 
In the financial framework for the EU-21, the total number of headings rises to 8, where 
heading number 8 refers to the interventions in the new member States. The table also 
reflects the annual appropriations for the commitments foreseen for the year 2006. 
Taking into account the 2006 figures for structural initiatives, we carry out a simulation 
exercise with the object of checking the extent to which projected funding will meet the 
financial requirements of extending objective 1 aid to CEEC. The simulation is based 
on GDPph data for 1997, the projected reduction in the number of EU-15 objective 1 
regions, and the hypothesis that 90% of CEEC population will be provided with 
objective 1 assistance. The simulation is carried out by first, computing the amounts 
required to provide financial assistance for 75% of the currently assisted population in 
EU-15 together with 90% of the CEEC population. An attempt is then made to marry 
this figure to the amount of resources foreseen for the objective 1 regions together with 
the allied structural interventions for the year 2006 (Objective 1 foreseen resources) 
within the EU-21 financial framework established by the Berlin European Council. The   27
results obtained under these hypothesis are given in the following tables (table 8 and 
table 9): 
The total amount of foreseen resources for the year 2006, within the Financial 
Framework EU-21, for structural initiatives in the objective 1 regions, may be 
calculated in the following way. We first take the amount that would correspond to the 
future Member States under the headings of Structural Operations and Pre-adhesion Aid 
for the year 2006 and then add the currently foreseen figure for 2006 i.e. the figure 
corresponding to financial perspectives EU15. The result is a total of 32.115 Million 
euros at 1999 prices. If, to this amount we add the projected increase in resources that 
would come from the growth in GNP for 2007 according to the assumptions used in the 
financial framework (0.45% of GNP devoted to Structural initiatives), a further 919 
million euros should be generated.  As a result, the total resources for structural 
initiatives in the objective 1 regions for the year 2007 would be 33.034 Million euros. 
 









Source: Author´s own elaboration 
 
On the “needs” side, if we look at the scenario in which 75% of the currently assisted 
population in the objective 1 regions receive support for the current programming 
period 2000-2006, a scenario in which there is a compensatory mechanism that 
rebalances the “effects of statistical convergence”, the total figure for “needs” is 13.077 
Meuros  for the year 2007 if we use  the average aid per head for 2006, a figure which 
becomes 13.664 Meuros if  we use the average aid per head for the period  2000-2006.  
If we go on to assume that 90% of the population from the 12 acceding Central and 
Eastern European countries will have a per capita GDP that is lower than 75% of the 
EU average, total “needs” for the year 2007 will be either; 19,884 Meuros if we take the 
919  2007 Increase. (0.45% from 2.15% GDP
17.435  Objective 1 EU-15 
(65.4% of 26.660 - year 2006)
33,034  TOTAL RESOURCES 2007
32,115  Subtotal in EU 21 Financial Framework
2,600  Pre-accesion Aid 
12,080  Structural Operations Acceding Countries
Thousands 
Meuros 1999 
RESOURCES FOR OBJECTIVE 1  28
average aid per head for the year 2006 in the objective 1 regions, or a slightly higher 
figure of 20,777 Meuros if we use the average aid per head for 2000-2006 in the 
objective 1 regions. 
These calculations demonstrate that, under the assumptions of the EU’s current 
financial framework for 2000-2006, the above scenario, provides the amounts necessary 
for both, EU enlargement and in order to counterbalance the statistical effect of the 
incorporation of new member states while maintaining funding for ¾ of the objective 1 
populations in the current EU15. If the average aid per head for 2000-2006 in objective 
1 regions is adopted as the criteria which determines those regions whose development 
is lagging, a funding requirement of 34.441 Meuros would be needed. This criteria 
therefore, foresees a gap of 1.407 Meuros.  





          
 Source: Author´s own elaboration, (*) Cyprus and Malta not included 
 
This funding requirement for the objective 1 regions can be compared with the amounts 
devoted to the regions, which are deemed to be objective 2 and 3, and to which 8,379 
Meuros have been designated, and also with the Cohesion Fund to which 2,510 Meuros 
have been assigned. It would be a mistake however, to attempt to divert funds from the 
objective 2 and 3 regions, and the cohesion fund, since this would obviously be 
detrimental to regional policy. A slight increase in GNP, arising from the foreseen 
structural interventions, should easily cover the shortfall of 1,407 Meuros however.  







-1,407  73 Difference to Total Resources
34,441  32,961 Total Amount Obj 1 EU-25 (*)
20,777  19,884 90% Population CEEAC












1,407  Financial gap for Objective 1 
Maintaining the real value of aid per head 
4,750  0.05% over GDP
2,510  Cohesion Fund 
8,379  Objective 2 and 3 
Meuros 99 COMPARATIVE VALUE  
OBJECTIVE 1 FINANCIAL GAP   29
Source: Author´s own elaboration 
 
These computations are not aimed at influencing the amounts that EU Regional Policy 
should assign with respect to the future programming period 2000-2006. These figures 
are obtained via the complex process of political debate, and by taking into account the 
goals set by the future EU regional policy. These goals must include the management of 
a considerable increase in the disparities in levels of development.  Policy must also 
establish the criteria by which the objective 2 regions (regions with structural problems) 
and objective 3 (human resources and employment) are designated. Further, the 
potential pit-falls inherent in European Spatial Development must be avoided, and the 
problems of coordinating policy and balancing territorial development addressed. 
These objectives are far-reaching and should be tackled using a financial framework 
that is ambitious enough to take advantage of the development and benefits derived 
from cohesion, thus fortifying a stable but dynamic European Union. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we show that since the reform of the European Union regional policy, 
objective 1 regions (on average) have performed better of than EU15 as a whole. By 
using a generalized entropy index such as the Theil index, we proved that there is a 
synchronization between the convergence and catching-up process of objective 1 
regions towards the EU15 average with the reform of the EU regional policy. During 
the period 1982-1988 the Theil index shows that inequalities between objective 1 
regions and non-objective 1 regions have increased while from 1989 onwards the 
reduction in the inequalities between these two groups has been the norm. These results 
of a better performance of objective 1 regions than EU15 as a whole has been confirmed 
in a more detailed analysis carried out in section 3 of the paper. We also remark the fact 
that there are high disparate rates of growth among objective 1 regions both within 
countries and across countries but our computations show also a trend towards a more 
balanced growth among objective 1 regions within and across EU countries. This 
success of the European Union regional policy in objective 1 regions will mean a big 
opportunity for Central and Eastern European countries and at the same time could be a 
threaten for current objective 1 regions in the sense of a premature withdrawal of their 
funding and the lost of momentum in terms of growth they have attained. In the last part 
of the paper we did a simulation showing that it would be feasible to maintain funding   30
for 75% of the current objective 1 regions while supplying a mean level of assistance to 
90% of the population in the 10 CEEC. To do so would be compatible with the financial 
budget and the levels of resources available.  
This scenario should not be considered as an end in itself, at least not politically, since 
there will be an increased need for a cohesion policy in an enlarged Union. There are 
several potential ways of adjusting Economic and Social Cohesion Policy in order to 
cope with the enlargement of the EU to take in the CEECs. However, Structural Funds 
and Cohesion Policy have to remain focused on economic development policies, 
allowing the objective 1 regions in the current EU-15 to remain harnessed to the 
positive dynamic which has been established, whilst at the same time providing a 
staunch bulwark of economic protection for the whole of the Union and a further source 
of economic expansion for the CEECs. This demands that the focus on the less 
developed regions be maintained while extending assistance to the acceding CEE 
countries.  
One of the thorniest issues with respect to accession remains the management of 
structural funds. The weaknesses inherent in the administrative system diminished what 
positive effects might have been derived from the first Greek CSF (Georgiou, 1993, 
European Commission 1996c, 1997a) or possibly even the second CSF in Italy 
Mezzogiorno (Leonardi 1995, European Commission, 1995b, 1996c, Roeger 1996, 
Svimez 1996b). The examples of Greece and Italy therefore, underline the need for a 
competent, efficient, management system. 
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                                                                   Annex A 
 
Objective 1 Group   Non-Objective 1 Group 
  
Lüneburg Région  Bruxelles  Saarland  Emilia-Romagna 
Galicia Antwerpen  Schleswig-Holstein  Toscana 
Principado de Asturias Limburg (B)  Denmark  Umbria 
Cantabria Oost-Vlaanderen  Pais  Vasco  Marche 
Aragón Vlaams  Brabant 
Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra Lazio 
Castilla y León  West-Vlaanderen  La Rioja  Abruzzo 
Castilla-la Mancha  Brabant Wallon  Comunidad de Madrid  Luxembourg 
Extremadura Hainaut  Cataluña  Groningen 
Comunidad 
Valenciana  Liège Baleares  Friesland 
Andalucia  Luxembourg (B)  Île de France  Drenthe 
Murcia Namur  Champagne-Ardenne  Utrecht 
Ceuta y Melilla  (ES)  Stuttgart  Picardie  Noord-Holland 
Canarias  (ES)  Karlsruhe  Haute-Normandie  Zuid-Holland 
Anatoliki Makedonia  Freiburg  Centre  Zeeland 
Kentriki Makedonia  Tübingen  Basse-Normandie  Noord-Brabant 
Dytiki Makedonia  Oberbayern  Bourgogne  Limburg (NL) 
Thessalia  Niederbayern  Nord - Pas-de-Calais  Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 
Ipeiros Oberpfalz  Lorraine   
Ionia Nisia  Oberfranken  Alsace   
Dytiki Ellada  Mittelfranken  Franche-Comté   
Sterea Ellada  Unterfranken  Pays de la Loire   
Peloponnisos Schwaben  Bretagne   
Attiki Bremen  Poitou-Charentes   
Voreio Aigaio  Hamburg  Aquitaine   
Notio Aigaio  Darmstadt  Midi-Pyrénées   
Kriti Gießen  Limousin   
Ireland Kassel  Rhône-Alpes  
Molise Braunschweig  Auvergne   
Campania Hannover  Languedoc-Roussillon   
Puglia Weser-Ems  Provence-Alpes-Côte  d'Azur  
Basilicata Düsseldorf  Corse   
Calabria Köln Piemonte   
Sicilia Münster  Valle  d'Aosta   
Sardegna Detmold  Liguria   
Norte Arnsberg  Lombardia   
Centro (P)  Koblenz  Trentino-Alto Adige   
Alentejo Trier Veneto   
Algarve 
Rheinhessen-
Pfalz Friuli-Venezia  Giulia   














                                        Annex B 
       
Group  Non-Objective 1 Group 
       
 Niederösterreich  Denmark  Friesland 
 Wien   Pais  Vasco  Drenthe 
 Kärnten   
Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra Overijssel 
Asturias Steiermark   La  Rioja  Gelderland 
 Oberösterreich  Aragón  Utrecht 
n  Salzburg    Comunidad de Madrid  Noord-Holland 
ncha Tirol    Cataluña  Zuid-Holland 
 Vorarlberg   Baleares  Zeeland 
Région Bruxelles  Itä-Suomi  Noord-Brabant 
 Antwerpen   Väli-Suomi  Limburg  (NL) 
 Limburg  (B)   Pohjois-Suomi  Stockholm 
a  (ES)  Oost-Vlaanderen  Uusimaa (suuralue)  Östra Mellansverige 
) Vlaams  Brabant  Åland  Sydsverige 
  West-Vlaanderen  Île de France  Norra Mellansverige 
edonia  Brabant Wallon  Champagne-Ardenne  Mellersta Norrland 
donia Liège    Picardie  Övre  Norrland 
nia  Luxembourg (B)  Haute-Normandie  Småland med öarna 
  Namur    Centre  Tees Valley and Durham 
 Stuttgart   Basse-Normandie  Northumberland,  Tyne  and  Wear 
 Karlsruhe   Bourgogne  Cumbria 
 Freiburg   Nord  -  Pas-de-Calais  Cheshire 
Tübingen   Lorraine  Greater  Manchester 
Oberbayern   Alsace  Lancashire 
 Niederbayern  Franche-Comté  Merseyside 
Oberpfalz    Pays de la Loire  East Riding and North Lincolnshire 
 Oberfranken   Bretagne  North  Yorkshire 
 Mittelfranken   Poitou-Charentes  South  Yorkshire 
 Unterfranken   Aquitaine  West  Yorkshire 
 Schwaben   Midi-Pyrénées  Derbyshire  and  Nottinghamshire 
  Bremen    Limousin  Leicestershire, Rutland and Northants 
 Hamburg   Rhône-Alpes  Lincolnshire 
 Darmstadt   Auvergne  Herefordshire,  Worcestershire  and  Warks 
 Gießen   Languedoc-Roussillon  Shropshire  and  Staffordshire 
 Kassel   Provence-Alpes  West  Midlands 
 Braunschweig  Piemonte  East  Anglia 
 Hannover   Valle  d'Aosta  Bedfordshire,  Hertfordshire 
 Lüneburg   Liguria  Essex 
 Weser-Ems   Lombardia    London 
  Düsseldorf    Trentino-Alto Adige  Berkshire, Bucks and Oxfordshire 
do Tejo  Köln    Veneto  Surrey, East and West Sussex 
  Münster    Friuli-Venezia Giulia  Hampshire and Isle of Wight 
 Detmold   Emilia-Romagna  Kent 
  Arnsberg    Toscana  Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and North Somerset 
Koblenz    Umbria  Dorset and Somerset 
nd  Trier    Marche  Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 
 Rheinhessen-Pfalz Lazio  Devon 
 Saarland   Luxembourg    Wales   
 
Schleswig-
Holstein  Groningen   Scotland 















            Objective 1 Group 
    
Lüneburg   Dytiki  Ellada 
Galicia   Sterea  Ellada
Principado de Asturias  Peloponnisos
Cantabria   Attiki 
Aragón   Voreio  Aigaio
Castilla y León  Notio Aigaio 
Castilla-la Mancha  Kriti 
Extremadura   Ireland 
Comunidad Valenciana  Molise 
Andalucia   Campania 
Murcia   Puglia 
Ceuta y Melilla  (ES)  Basilicata 
Canarias  (ES)  Calabria 
Anatoliki Makedonia  Sicilia 
Kentriki Makedonia  Sardegna 
Dytiki Makedonia  Norte 
Thessalia   Centro  (P) 
Ipeiros   Alentejo 
Ionia Nisia    Algarve 
   
The Non-Objective 1 Group of Annex C takes in the regions that are in Annex B except 
these ones.  
 
 
 